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Abstract 
We investigate the takeover strategies of high default risk acquirers and their value impact. 
We find that these bidders select bigger, less profitable and unrelated targets, pursue 
transactions during recessions, and pay with shares by offering target shareholders high 
premiums. Their long-term buy-and-hold returns are extremely negative, and reflect 
fundamentally their substantial drop in profitability combined with high leverage. We show 
that the well-established long-run underperformance of acquiring firms is largely driven by 
this sub-set of acquirers. The results are similar when we use alternative measures of default 
risk and performance, and a global sample of non-US bidders. 
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1. Introduction 
In January 2017 Tesco, a globally diversified grocery and general merchandise 
retailer, launched a bid for Booker, the UK’s biggest grocery wholesaler. Its chief executive 
asserted that the £3.7bn acquisition will be different from the 80% of corporate deals that 
serve only to make the acquiring shareholders poorer. He argued that the deal is part of 
Tesco’s recovery, not a distraction from it, and it will allow the firm to grow quickly. 
However, this decision led to an unprecedented resignation of one non-executive director 
who refused to back the deal, and many shareholders revolted stating that the high price 
makes value destruction likely, and that Tesco should make its business simpler, not more 
complex (Financial Times, 2017). At the time of the deal, Tesco’s Z-score was 1.52, its credit 
rating was cut to below investment grade, and for the last three years - since its accounting 
scandal - its stock price had declined by more than 70% and it had not reinstated dividends. 
This anecdotal evidence is not exceptional. We find that many global mergers and 
acquisitions (M&As) are undertaken by similar high default risk bidders, in line with Zhang 
(2017) who reports that many acquisitions in the US between 2010 and 2014 came from 
distressed acquirers. These M&As are intriguing as they raise important questions relating 
to their ability to create value. While Tesco’s shares are down 20% six months after the bid 
announcement, it is not clear whether all such bids destroy value. We address this issue by 
investigating the bid characteristics, post-deal operating performance, and announcement 
and long-term returns of high default risk acquirers. Perhaps surprisingly, this paper pioneers 
in studying the value creation of deals undertaken by distressed bidders. While many 
academics have been investigating M&A, default risk and failure prediction models, we have 
a limited understanding of distress-related M&A. Some studies focus on acquiring distressed 
targets, but literature is still in its infancy when it comes to studying M&A by acquirers who 
face potential economic or financial distress.  
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M&As are controversial. Past studies show that acquirers use estimated synergies 
and technological needs to justify them (e.g., Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford, 2001; Bena 
and Li, 2014; Higgins and Rodriguez, 2006). However, many lead to substantial wealth 
destruction for the acquirer’s shareholders (e.g., Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1990; Moeller, 
Schlingemann, and Stulz, 2004; Malmendier and Tate, 2008), given the high risk and large 
acquisition premium paid, and the agency conflicts between managers and shareholders.1 
M&As undertaken by high default risk firms are likely to be even more debateable. 
On the one hand, they will create value if they constitute a strategic turnaround option to 
revert past managers’ failed strategy, and represent attempts to improve the firms’ 
competitive position, or to exit a difficult environment. Previous studies on corporate 
restructuring support the idea that firms may use takeovers to change strategy and regain 
financial strength by acquiring companies that fit into their core business (Hofer, 1980; 
Trahms, Ndofor, and Sirmon, 2013). Lai and Sudarsanam (1997) find that, in the year of 
decline, 50.2% of underperforming firms undertake M&As, which is ranked third in order 
of importance after operational restructuring and capital expenditure.  Furthermore, 
acquisitions may help high default risk bidders to mitigate risk by diversifying, hence 
decreasing asset volatility, causing a reduction in bankruptcy risk as well as gains from 
financial synergies (Hubbard and Palia, 1999), and incentivizing employees to innovate 
(Fulghieri and Sevilir, 2011; Lee, Mauer and Xu, 2018; Tate and Yang, 2015). They are also 
likely to be highly scrutinised by shareholders and the board of directors (ABA, 2010). These 
arguments suggest that M&As of high default risk bidders are value enhancing. 
However, high default risk bidders are normally presumed to undertake cash 
conserving and/or generating strategies, such as cost rationalization, raising capital and asset 
sales, rather than risky cash depleting M&As (Hotchkiss, John, Mooradian, and Thorburn, 
2008). Managers may recur to takeovers for private benefits reasons, principally to maintain 
                                                 
1 See Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford (2001), Betton et al. (2008), and Bruner (2002) for extensive reviews.  
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their compensation (Arnold, 2014), and to avoid or at least delay bankruptcy, which is likely 
to result in personal bankruptcy costs that include forced career changes, and a loss of human 
and equity capital (Eckbo, Thorburn, and Wang, 2016). These managerial private benefits 
will induce a creation and/or protection of self-sustaining and inefficient empires at the 
expense of shareholder value maximization, resulting in negative returns. 
We use a sample of 1,758 completed US takeovers over the period 1989-2011 to test 
these claims. We identify 440 high default risk bidders using Merton’s (1974) distance-to-
default (DD), in line with earlier studies (Hillegeist, Keating, Cram, and Lundstedt, 2004; 
Vassalou and Xing, 2004; Zhang, 2017).2 While announcement returns are similar across 
both groups we report that the average 3-year post-bid peer-adjusted buy-and-hold returns 
(BHARs) of these bidders amount to -24.7% and are significantly negative, compared to 
+1.0% for the low default risk control group. Moreover, the Carhart (1997) four-factor model 
alphas are significantly negative for high default risk bidders (-0.873) whilst non-significant 
for the control sample. We find analogous results when we use a global sample of 2,351 
completed bids from 38 non-US countries, and a large variety of alternative performance 
and default risk measures. In summary, the results indicate that managers of high default risk 
firms pursue worse acquisitions on average and support the agency problem hypothesis. 
We unveil that high default risk bidders adopt unconventional M&A strategies. They 
are more likely to take over unrelated targets, probably to exit a troubled industry, to lower 
risk and generate diversification synergies, in line with previous evidence (e.g., Hubbard and 
Palia, 1999; Zhang, 2017). However their diversification is not necessarily beneficial, as 
industry relatedness is negatively related to announcement returns, in contrast to previous 
evidence (e.g., Harford and Uysal, 2014), yet unrelated to their long-run returns. We also 
                                                 
2 Here defined as the sample’s quartile with the highest distance-to-default. Because of estimation complexities, 
discussed below, we refer to these firms as high default risk rather than distressed. Our aim is not to assess the 
strategies of all high default risk firms, but to focus on only those that engaged in takeovers and assess their 
motivation and stock price performance relative to other bidders with relatively low default/distress risk. 
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find that their targets are relatively larger, more levered and have negative interest coverage 
ratios and a more likely to be loss making. 
In addition, and in line with empirical evidence of Zhang (2017), we show that high 
default risk bidders are more likely to pay with shares. These results are surprising and raise 
a question of why target shareholders accept high default risk bidders’ stock, which is likely 
to be undervalued. We consider the possibility that the high-default risk acquirers entice 
them by paying high premiums so that they are adequately compensated for the risk taken. 
We regress the merger premium against the interaction term between high-default risk and 
stock financed deals. We find that high-default risk acquirers pay higher premiums to target 
firms in general. Moreover, the coefficient on the interaction term is positive, suggesting that 
high-default risk acquirers pay more premiums to target firms for deals with a greater 
fraction of stock payment.3 The results imply that high default risk bidders induce target 
shareholders to accept shares, probably because they are over-levered, in line with Harford, 
Klasa and Walcott (2009), and they do not have any other alternative to finance their deals. 
The ex-post industry-adjusted ROA of the high default risk bidders declines 
significantly, contributing substantially to their long-term underperformance. For both 
groups, the BHARs are positively related to the 3 years post-bid ROA, but negatively related 
to leverage, in line with Malmendier et al. (2012), suggesting that the market views debt as 
detrimental to the long-term bidders’ health. However, the marginal effects of these variables 
are more prominent for high default risk bidders, reflecting their dependence on excessive 
debt financing and their ostensible inability to generate the expected synergy gains.    
We contribute to various streams of research in a number of ways. We provide a 
comprehensive investigation of the takeover strategies, wealth effects and post-deal 
operating performance of a special bidder category, namely high default risk acquirers. 
                                                 
3 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this alternative explanation.  
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Importantly, we demonstrate the necessity to separately analyze these bidders as their long-
term accounting and stock returns are distinct. A key finding of our paper is that the long-
term underperformance of M&A should essentially not be generalized. It is mainly restricted 
to the subsample of deals pursued by bidders with high default risk. This commonly observed 
underperformance is noteworthy given that, in theory, takeovers are expected to create value. 
Numerous studies interpret the negative BHARs as evidence of, among others, managerial 
empire building and other private benefits (Jensen, 1986; Harford and Li, 2007), or CEO 
overconfidence (Rau and Vermaelen, 1998; Malmendier and Tate, 2008). Our results show 
that agency problems are relevant in explaining M&A activity of high default risk bidders.   
There is only a thin body of literature indirectly related to our work. Pryshchepa, 
Aretz and Banerjee (2013) analyse a small number of distressed firms and obtain preliminary 
evidence that they engage in often questionable M&As in the years before bankruptcy. 
Harford and Uysal (2014) assess the impact of financial constraints on M&A activity and 
outcomes to find that non-rated (i.e., constrained) bidders display better announcement and 
long-run returns. While they do not make explicit references to high default risk firms, some 
of their arguments are relatively similar in nature to ours. Yet, whilst our high default risk 
bidders are likely to be more financially constrained than low default risk bidders, the 
fundamental characteristics of our high default risk group are divergent. Both groups share 
smaller size and higher leverage, while our high default risk bidders also have lower 
profitability and negative interest coverage. The fact that they find that more constrained firms 
do better deals while our high default bidders make worse acquisitions (driven by private 
benefits) provides further evidence that both groups have different attributes. The work most 
closely related to ours is Zhang (2017) who finds that distressed firms acquire for 
diversification, rather than the risk-shifting or growth opportunity reasons, but does not 
explore the associated return effects.  
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The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a brief literature 
review and develops the hypotheses. Section 3 reports the data and methodology. Section 4 
discusses the empirical results and robustness checks. The conclusions are in Section 5. 
 
2. Literature review and hypothesis development 
In strategy and corporate finance, abundant literature exists on the value effects of 
M&A, and its determinants. Studies identified several operational and financial objectives 
for corporate acquisitions like creating synergies, improving competitive power, and 
transferring managerial skills or technological expertise. On average, mergers and 
acquisitions do not result in positive returns for the acquiring firm, despite an increase in 
firm efficiency, operating performance and combined entity value.4 With respect to risk 
implications, two strands of literature have emerged: diversification effects reducing risk 
(Amihud and Lev, 1981) and leverage effects raising risk (Ghosh and Jain, 2000; Harford et 
al., 2009). Most studies document that bidder risk, as proxied by total, systematic and 
idiosyncratic volatility, increases following takeovers (Langetieg et al., 1980; Geppert and 
Kamerschen, 2008). Ex-post, the bidders’ default risk also increases as the high leverage and 
managerial actions outweigh the effects of asset diversification (Furfine and Rosen, 2011).  
Similarly, many academic studies investigate default risk, with a particular focus on 
failure prediction models (Merton, 1974; Altman, 1968; Ohlson, 1980). To date, surprisingly 
little is known about the combination of both domains, namely ‘distress-related’ M&A. To 
our knowledge, only a few papers focus on distressed targets. These targets may present 
unique opportunities for potential buyers as they are often driven by synergies such as 
efficiency gains, higher market power and redeployment of assets to more profitable uses 
                                                 
4 See for example, among others, Jensen and Ruback (1983); Agrawal et al. (1992); Healy et al. (1992); 
Andrade et al. (2001); Schoar (2002) ; Moeller et al. (2004); Maksimovic et al. (2011). However, Mitchell and 
Stafford (2000) argue that some methodological issues are likely to affect long-term underperformance 
measures. Using announcement returns, Alexandridis et al. (2017) show that deals in the post-2009 financial 
crisis period create value, even when acquiring large, public targets in stock-financed transactions.  
9 
 
(Jory and Madura, 2009; Almeida et al., 2011), a removal of inefficient management 
(Hotchkiss, 1995; Denis and Denis, 1995) and financial frictions (Erel et al., 2015), tax losses 
carried forward (Crawford and Lechner, 1996), and cheap valuations of distressed targets 
and assets (Eckbo and Thorburn, 2008). Empirical work on healthy firms taking over 
distressed targets usually reports findings that are similar to or better than those for 
acquisitions of non-troubled companies (Ang and Mauck, 2011; Meier and Servaes, 2015), 
but these bids are considered to be more risky (Nesvold et al., 2012). 
Studies on acquisitions by distressed bidders are scarce. Zhang (2017) provides a 
detailed analysis of the motives behind this type of deals and shows that such acquisitions 
are economically important. Using a tax reform reducing debt restructuring costs and 
bankruptcy risk as a natural experiment, he finds that distressed firms react by decreasing 
diversifying acquisitions. His evidence supports the diversification hypothesis, which claims 
that distressed bidders acquire to lower the probability of bankruptcy, rather than the growth 
opportunity hypothesis, suggesting that the rationale behind such deals is to capture external 
growth opportunities. Compared to their healthy counterparts, distressed firms announce less 
acquisitions, acquire smaller targets with lower market-to-book ratios, and pay less in cash.  
Harford and Uysal (2014) investigate the effects of financial constraints on M&A 
activity and performance by zooming in on non-rated firms, which are presumed to have 
constrained access to debt markets. They develop two related hypotheses to explain the 
relationship between having a credit rating and investment behaviour. The financial 
constraint hypothesis suggests that firms with constrained access to the public debt market 
invest less. The free cash flow hypothesis posits that firms with limited access to public debt 
markets have smaller borrowing capacity with less discretion on their investments. Both 
hypotheses predict that firms will make value-increasing and less costly investments. 
Empirically, they find that non-rated US firms tend to undertake less acquisitions, pay lower 
premiums, and generate higher announcement date and long-term returns than rated firms.  
10 
 
In this paper, we focus on the value effects of M&As undertaken by high default risk 
firms. A wide set of arguments leads to the hypothesis that these deals will create value. 
First, they are likely to be part of a wide-ranging comprehensive organizational change in 
governance, management, operations, assets, and capital structure, that would not have 
occurred when the firm is financially healthy, aimed at improving the use and efficiency of 
resources. Corporate restructuring studies indeed confirm the notion that acquisitions serve 
to revert the bidder’s strategy and improve its financial health (Trahms et al., 2013). 
Furthermore, high leverage and distress entail some positive effects. The limited free cash 
flow (Jensen, 1986) prevents empire building transactions and there is a disciplining effect 
precluding or at least reducing the chance of making inefficient investments (Chava and 
Roberts, 2008).5According to the oversight hypothesis, M&As of high default risk bidders 
will create value because the investment is more likely to be a well-considered restructuring 
strategy, vetted scrupulously by the board, shareholders and also debtholders, since in high 
default risk scenarios investment decisions increasing equity value may reduce enterprise 
value (ABA, 2010; Hotchkiss et al., 2008).6 In line with Alexandridis, Antypas and Travlos 
(2017), who find strong evidence that post 2009 financial crisis M&A creates value because 
of profound improvements in corporate governance quality, one may assume that distressed 
bidders’ governance enhancements will positively impact their acquisition strategies and 
payoffs. The incumbent or new managers who have learned lessons from prior value-
destroying investments are equally expected to engage only in value-enhancing acquisitions.  
Additionally, high default risk bidders are assumed to mitigate risk by taking over 
unrelated targets to diversify cash flow exposure and decrease asset volatility (Billett, King, 
and Mauer, 2004; Zhang, 2017). Although most previous studies argue that diversification 
                                                 
5 This is largely similar to Harford and Uysal (2014) who use the financial constraint and free cash flow 
hypothesis to explain why firms with constrained access to financing make better acquisitions. 
6 See Hotchkiss et al. (2008), Senbet and Wang (2012) and (ABA, 2010) for discussions and evidence. 
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destroys value, leading to as the conglomerate discount,7 recent studies suggest that it leads 
to a reduction in bankruptcy risk and to significant gains from financial synergies (Hubbard 
and Palia, 1999). Moreover, de Andrés, de la Fuente, and Velasco (2017) report that 
diversification aimed at exploiting growth options rather than exercising available options is 
value enhancing. Diversification could as well be beneficial for high default risk bidders if 
it reduces information asymmetries and possible mispricing (Monk, 2017). Diversification 
may also be advantageous from a labour market perspective. For example, Fulghieri and 
Sevilir (2011) argue that despite market power benefits mergers between firms operating in 
similar product markets may lower employees’ incentives to innovate because of decreased 
competition for human capital allowing for an extraction of greater employee rents. 
Empirically, Lee et al. (2018) show that merger payoffs are higher when firms have related 
human capital and do not operate in the same industries or product markets as such deals 
result in a greater ability to lay off low quality and/or duplicate employees. Tate and Yang 
(2015) find that workers in diversified firms develop skills that transfer across multiple lines 
of business, leading to real option benefits to redeploy labour in response to changing 
opportunities. These gains are probably significant for high default risk acquirers.  
Overall, these assertions suggest that high default risk bidders are expected to 
undertake synergetic, value increasing and diversifying M&As, leading to positive 
announcement and long-run returns. We formalize the discussion above with the following 
testable hypothesis.  
H1a: The level of acquirers’ default risk is positively associated with M&A gains.  
Alternatively, there are a number of reasons to believe that acquisitions by distressed 
bidders may destroy value. Ample empirical evidence is available for regular M&A 
producing disappointing outcomes. This could, for instance, be explained by Roll’s (1986) 
                                                 
7 See Maksimovic and Phillips (2013), and Martin and Sayrak (2003) for an extensive review. 
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hubris theory, which postulates that the over-confidence of an acquiring firm’s management 
induces them to overvalue the target and/or the potential synergies, resulting in excessive 
premiums. This over-confidence usually extends from bidders’ exceptionally strong past 
performance. They will oftentimes pursue publicly quoted targets, overpay and engage in 
contested bids.8 Given that distressed bidders do not have a solid historical performance, we 
do not assume that hubris problems are a key motive for their M&A, yet we claim that agency 
problems are particularly relevant within the context of their bids. 
Agency conflicts have been widely debated in the broad M&A literature; they 
include mainly empire building, compensation and career concerns. For example, Jensen 
(1989:66) argues that "corporate growth enhances the social prominence, public prestige, 
and political power of senior executives" and "managers have many incentives to expand 
company size beyond that which maximizes shareholder wealth. Compensation is one of the 
most important managerial incentives." More recently, Jenter and Lewellen (2015) find that 
CEOs of targets tend to accept bids only near retirement, while those with high debt-based 
compensation tend to engage in low-risk conservative investments to reduce their firms’ 
default risk and thus protect their future, in line with Sundaram and Yermack (2007) and 
Cassell, Huang, Sanchez, and Stuart (2012). 
Such agency conflicts are likely more severe for distressed bidders. Managers may 
diversify through acquisitions in an attempt to attain their personal goals. Jensen’s (1986) 
free cash flow theory casts doubt on whether a firm that chooses to enter into industries 
where it has no demonstrated expertise acts in the best interests of shareholders. These 
diversification strategies generate limited synergies and are likely to aim at increasing firm 
size9, which may reduce bankruptcy risk yet will especially benefit management. Managers 
                                                 
8 See de Bodt, Cousin, and Roll (2018) for an extensive review of and evidence on overbidding driven by the 
presence of conflicts of interest and irrational bidding behaviour.  
9 See Alexandridis et al. (2013) for a review of and evidence on the negative impact of deal size and value 
creation.  
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may pursue these transactions to accomplish private goals, like conserving their salaries 
(Arnold, 2014), and deferring or averting insolvency, which is likely causing substantial 
personal bankruptcy costs including the loss of private perks, reputation, equity and 
specialized human and equity capital and compulsory career modifications (Eckbo, et al., 
2016).10 These managerial private benefits may lead to the creation or protection of 
underperforming corporate empires. Investor monitoring may be circumvented by paying 
for such takeover targets with shares (Jensen, 1986). 
In line with agency theory predictions, Pryshchepa, Aretz and Banerjee (2013) show 
that distressed firms divert wealth through cash pay-outs or share repurchases and may 
engage in often questionable mergers and acquisitions. Graham, Harvey and Manju (2015) 
provide evidence that in major investment decisions, such as takeovers, CEOs are the 
dominant decision makers. In high default risk, we expect mangers to take into account first 
their career concerns and conduct acquisitions to avoid personal bankruptcy costs.  
Overall, these agency-based arguments imply that M&A activity by distressed 
bidders typically aims at growing firm size and diversifying risk to safeguard management 
interests. They will presumably produce unfavourable takeover outcomes, as summarized in 
our competing hypothesis.11   
H1b: The level of acquirers’ default risk is negatively associated with M&A gains. 
 
3.  Data and methodology 
3.1. Sample selection 
We start with a sample of 2,827 takeovers announced in the US from 1989 to 2011 
in the Thomson One Banker database. We then use the following criteria: (1) the acquiring 
                                                 
10 Next to M&A, they can do so through large cash holdings (Arnold, 2014; Bates, Kahle, and Stulz, 2009), 
low leverage (Strebulaev and Yang, 2013), and low risk investments (Eckbo and Thorburn, 2003; Eisdorfer, 
2008).  
11 Other predictions of the agency theory relate to risk-shifting and debt overhang problems (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Myers 1977) which we do not test directly, but we present in appendix risk shifting results. 
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firm is a publicly quoted company with available stock price data on Thomson DataStream, 
(2) the acquirer has a pre-acquisition stake of less than 50% and a final stake of more than 
50% in the target company, (3) accounting information of bidder and target is available from 
Worldscope, and (4) the sample excludes targets and acquirers from the financial industry, 
i.e., banks, insurance, real estate, holding and other investment companies (US SIC code 6).  
We measure bidder’s pre-bid default risk level using Merton’s (1974) distance-to-
default (DD, see Appendix 1) prior to deal announcement over the estimation window -280 
to -31 days. This measure is a market-based indicator to assess the number of standard 
deviations that the bidder’s market value of assets is away from default, which occurs when 
the market value of assets is lower than the book value of liabilities at maturity. It 
incorporates the key elements of a firm’s risk-return profile: level of stock return volatility, 
financial debt and expected asset returns. We rank bidders into quartiles. We refer to bidders 
in the highest default risk quartile as High default risk while we classify all others bidders as 
Low default risk.12 We winsorize our data at 1% to eliminate any outliers. The selection 
criteria imposed and data unavailability have limited our sample to 1,758 completed bids, 
split into 1,318 Low default risk and 440 High default risk bidders.  
Table 1, Panel A, shows a homogeneous annual distribution of High default risk 
bidders except for the dotcom period (1999-2003) and the 2009 crisis. Most deals are in 
manufacturing and services (Panel B). Panel C reports the distribution of the distance-to-
default, DD, variable. For our sample as a whole, the average DD is 7.558, in line with the 
results of Acharya et al. (2012) who show that, for their sample of 2,247 US firms that had 
at least one bond outstanding between 1996 and 2010, the average DD is 5.993. For our High 
risk of default sample, the average DD is 2.336, much closer to their 25% percentile of 3.375. 
Bharath and Shumway (2008) report an average probability of default of 10.95% for a 
                                                 
12 We use various rankings, including deciles, as in, for example, Bharath and Shumway, 2008, and Garlappi 
et al., 2008. We also use quintiles and deciles, instead of quartiles. Our key findings remain invariant.   
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sample of 1,449 firm defaults covering the period 1980–2003, corresponding to an average 
DD of 1.2291. However, this is an approximation.13 Overall, we do not expect any bias in 
our measurement of default risk yet we conduct robustness checks in subsequent sections.   
[Insert Table 1 here] 
3.2. Methodology 
We use standard event study methodology based on the market model to calculate 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) over a -2 to +2 trading days event window, with market 
model parameters estimated over -280 to -31 trading days prior to bid announcement. We 
download from Bloomberg our proxy for the market return, the MSCI US equity index. We 
test for robustness by computing CARs over various event windows and find similar results.  
As adequately evaluating long-term performance is challenging, we put forward a 
range of measures (Malmendier et al., 2012; Mitchell and Stafford, 2000).14 Market-adjusted 
monthly buy-and-hold returns (BHARs) are calculated over a 3 years holding period starting 
the third trading day after the completion date and ending 21 trading days later. Next, we 
compute the widely used peer-adjusted BHARs, following Barber and Lyon (1997). The 
accuracy of this approach evidently depends on matching quality. Barber and Lyon (1997) 
argue that mean reversion may lead to the conclusion that firms which perform poorly before 
an event improve performance post-event, whereas performance is just reverting towards the 
mean. To tackle this issue, a matched peer firm is selected with similar industry (same two-
digit US SIC code), size (market value of equity), market-to-book (MTB), and one year pre-
acquisition buy-and-hold returns to proxy the pre-bid performance (Datta et al., 2001; Billet 
et al., 2011). We require that peers are not involved in takeovers for 3 years pre- and post-
deal announcement. If relative target size is larger than one, we assign the target industry to 
                                                 
13 The formula is pi = N(-DD), so DD = - Q(pi), where Q is the quantile function of the standard normal distribution. 
However, this is only approximate because of Jensen’s inequality, which says that the average of a function is only equal 
to the function of the average if the function is linear, but N is highly non-linear. 
14 Malmendier et al. (2012) analyse bidding contests and use the loser’s post-merger performance to construct the 
counterfactual performance of the winner had he not won the contest. While bidder and loser returns are closely aligned 
before the contest, winners underperform losers by 50% over the following three years.  
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the bidder industry, which matters for industry-adjusted performance measures and 
diversification. For each sample firm, we examine all non-bidding firms with size between 
25% and 200% of the sample firm (Ghosh, 2001). We then sort these firms by MTB and 
historical stock returns. The matching criteria are all measured one month prior to bid 
announcement.15  
As an additional test, we also compute the Carhart (1997) four-factor model, that 
extends Fama and French (1993), who show that small firms and value firms (low MTB) 
generate higher returns, with a momentum factor. This calendar-time approach, unlike the 
event-time method, controls for cross-correlation in returns. Specifically, in each month of 
the 3 years post-acquisition period, we form a portfolio of sample firms and rebalance it 
monthly by adding bidders that complete an acquisition. We form a similar portfolio of non-
bidding matched peers and derive monthly abnormal returns.16  
3.3.  Research design and variable definitions  
To assess whether short and long-term performance differs across our groups, we 
compare bidder, target and deal characteristics, and run a set of logit regressions. We then 
estimate a regression model on excess returns controlling for a number of determinants 
stemming from the M&A literature. The variable definitions are in Appendix 2.  
We first control for bidder characteristics, including pre-bid performance, size, and 
financial risk. We include one year pre-bid ROA, cash to total assets,17 and pre-bid month 
MTB. To account for size, we use one year pre-bid book value of assets, or market value of 
equity, as Moeller et al. (2004) show that announcement effects are smaller for larger 
                                                 
15 The returns of 254 matched peers were partly replaced with the MSCI market return as their matched peer firm is delisted 
before the end of the sample holding period. This procedure does not significantly affect BHARs (Lyon et al., 1999). Our 
main results remain invariant when excluding those firms and their matched peers. 
16 We use Kenneth French (http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html#International) to 
download data. Momentum is the equal-weight average of returns for two winner portfolios for a region minus those of 
two loser portfolios. We do not have data to compute the five-factor model devised by Fama and French (2015). 
17 A number of previous studies show that companies hoard cash as a precautionary measure to overcome the financing 
frictions that prevent them from accessing external financing (Opler et al., 1999; Almeida et al., 2004; Bates et al., 2009). 
Acharya et al. (2012) link cash holdings to credit spread. They suggest that riskier firms have both higher cash reserves and 
credit spreads, and a greater long-term default probability.  
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acquirers, irrespective of method of payment and bidder public status. Finally, we analyse 
interest coverage and debt ratio, as Malmendier et al. (2012) suggests that investors may 
penalize high leverage. We include similar variables to account for target characteristics. 
Correspondingly, we examine differences in bid characteristics. High default risk 
bidders may potentially offer more favourable deal terms to persuade target shareholders, 
resulting in lower post-bid BHARs. We define acquisition premium as the percentage 
difference between the final bid and target stock price four weeks before acquisition 
announcement.18 We control for tender offers, which may lead to higher excess returns 
(Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Rau and Vermaelen, 1998). We include Proportion of stock to 
control for payment method and test for robustness using All Stock as a dummy variable 
equal to one if the transaction is fully paid in stock, which typically produces lower returns 
(e.g., Travlos, 1987; Loughran and Vijh, 1997). We expect higher returns for bids in the 
same two-digit US SIC industry, and for domestic transactions (Walker, 2000; Moeller and 
Schlingemann, 2005). We control for target public status as acquisitions of private targets 
may lead to higher excess returns (Moeller et al., 2004), and relative target size as larger 
deals might allow for more synergy gains and hence yield higher returns (Asquith, 1983). 
We incorporate dummy variables to control for time, industry and recessions, defined by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) as 1990-1993, 1998, 2001–2002 and 2008-2009.  
 
4. Empirical results 
4.1. The short and long-run returns of acquisitions by High default risk bidders  
Table 2, Panel A, reports the announcement date excess returns. High default risk 
bidders generate insignificant CARs of -0.9%, but a significant median of -1.6%. For the 
remaining bidders, both the means and medians are negative and significant. However, in 
                                                 
18 Premium is mostly analysed as a dependent variable (e.g., Rossi and Volpin, 2004). Hayward and Hambrick (1997) show 
that greater premiums are associated with CEO hubris and lower returns. Moeller et al. (2004) show that, for big firms, 
larger premiums reduce abnormal returns. 
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line with previous evidence, the economic significance of these returns is fairly modest. 
Across these groups, the difference in excess returns is not significant, suggesting that the 
market expects comparable relatively low synergies to be generated by both sets of bidders. 
Panel B reports striking results for 3 years peer-adjusted BHARs. The average 
(median) long-term returns of -24.7% (-23.4%) are significantly lower for High default risk 
bidders, compared to 1.04% (2.16%) for the remaining bidders.19 BHARs monotonically 
decrease from Q4 to Q1. Even relative to Q2-Q4, Q1 generates significantly lower BHARs. 
The differences in means and medians between the groups are strongly significant (p < 0.01). 
Panel C provides analogous results when using market-adjusted BHARs. While the 
mean (median) BHARs of the lowest default risk group are 8.2% (5.4%), they are strongly 
negative, amounting to -12.7% (-29.9%), for High default risk bidders. Similarly, Panel D 
indicates significantly negative alpha coefficients in the Carhart (1997) four-factor model of 
-0.87% per month for the High default risk sample, compared to an insignificant -0.11% for 
Q4. The alpha coefficient increases rather monotonically across the quartiles and proves 
significant for only Q1 and Q2. Remarkably, market risk is priced for all groups except Q4, 
while the size premium is not priced for Q1. The book-to-market and momentum factors do 
not turn out to be significant. Overall, these findings suggest that the well-established long-
run underperformance of acquiring companies is largely driven by High default risk bidders. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
4.2. The determinants of the announcement date returns and post-bid performance 
We now assess whether the takeover strategies adopted by the different bidders affect 
the observed dissimilar value effects. We analyse the bidder, target and deal characteristics, 
and post-bid operating performance, which we afterwards relate to ex-post returns.  
                                                 
19 Here defined as the sample’s quartile with the highest distance-to-default, i.e. Q4. We also examine potential survivorship 
bias in our sample. We find a probability of delisting of 8.8% for our High default risk firms during the three years post-
bid period, in line with DD values. Tracing our firms after this period is beyond the scope of our analysis. 
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4.2.1 Bidder, deal and target characteristics  
Table 3 reports bidder, target and deal characteristics. Panel A exhibits a two way 
comparative analysis of the bidder and target in each group and across the High and Low 
default risk sub-samples. The results reveal compelling discrepancies between target and 
bidder characteristics. Within each group, targets are relatively smaller, have lower growth 
and hold more cash.  However, there are some marked disparities across the two groups. In 
particular, High default risk bidders are significantly smaller, less profitable, and have higher 
leverage (in contrast to Strebulaev and Yang, 2013), than the remaining bidders. Their low 
MTB rules out the Rau and Vermaelen (1998) performance extrapolation hypothesis. 
Interestingly, High and Low default risk bidders acquire targets with divergent 
characteristics. As expected, targets of High default risk bidders are relatively smaller and 
have significantly lower profitability, interest cover and growth yet higher leverage.   
In Panel B, we contrast deal characteristics. The results demonstrate that High default 
risk bidders are more inclined to opt for larger, domestic, and private targets. Takeover 
premiums are similar across both groups, in contrast to hubris theory predictions (de Bodt et 
al., 2018). Surprisingly, and in contrast to debt overhang theory prognostications, a larger 
proportion of their deals is financed with equity (55% vs. 37%, p difference in means and 
media = 0.00). We find same results when we use a dummy for all stock payment as 40 
percent of the deals by High distressed bidders are financed with only stock compared to 22 
percent for Low default risk bidders (p difference in means and media = 0.00). In line with 
Halford, Klasa and Walcott (2009), we suggest that since high default risk bidders have 
significantly higher leverage than the low default risk counterparts, they are likely to be over 
their target leverage level, and, consequently, they finance their targets with shares.  We 
explore further this method of financing issue in the next section.  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
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Table 4, Panel A, presents multivariate logit regressions in which the dependent 
variable takes a value of one if the bidder is High default risk and zero if it is Low default 
risk measured either as the remaining three quartiles (1), or the last quartile (2).  Confirming 
the univariate findings, High default risk bidders are smaller and more levered, and have 
lower profitability and growth. They select relatively larger targets and display a higher 
propensity for unrelated transactions, deals during recessions, and reverse takeovers. We 
find similar results when we include interest cover. 
In line with the univariate results, the regression results indicate strong preference 
for High default risk bidder to pay with shares as the coefficients of Stock percentage in 
equations (1) and (2) are positive and significant. We obtain similar results when we use all 
stock dummy. These results raise a question as to why target shareholders accept high default 
risk bidders’ stock, which is likely to be undervalued. We assess whether High-default risk 
acquirers entice target shareholders to accept shares by paying more premiums to 
compensate them adequately for the risk they take. We test this proposition by evaluating 
the impact of an interaction term between high-default risk and stock financed deals on 
merger premium, defined as the price paid per share minus stock price of target 4 weeks 
before acquisition announcement, divided by the stock price of the target 4 weeks before 
acquisition announcement. Following prior studies such as Moeller (2005) and Fich et al., 
(2016), we also include target firm and deal characteristics that are related to merger 
premiums as additional control variables. We find that high-default risk acquirers pay higher 
premiums to target firms in general. Moreover, the coefficient on the interaction term is 
positive, suggesting that high-default risk acquirers pay more premiums to target firms for 
deals with a greater fraction of stock payment. These results are in Appendix 3.20   
                                                 
20 In addition to this suggestion by an anonymous referee, we consider also alternative explanations for our 
results. In line with Halford, Klasa and Walcott (2009), we suggest that, since high default risk bidders have 
significantly higher leverage than the low default risk counterparts, they are likely to be over their target 
leverage level, and, consequently, they finance their targets with shares. Moreover, consistent with Jensen’s 
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We note however that several of these bidder characteristics are, by construction, 
components of our distress measure (distance-to-default). Table 4, Panel B, reports the logit 
regressions in which the dependent variable takes a value of one if the firm is the bidder and 
zero if it is the target, to capture variance in bidder and target characteristics for each group. 
As expected, both sets of bidders take over smaller targets. However, the most prominent 
finding is that Low (High) default risk firms tend to take over more (less) profitable targets. 
Moreover, the targets of Low default risk bidders have lower interest coverage and leverage. 
In contrast, targets of High default risk bidders have lower growth (potential), but similar 
interest coverage, leverage and cash holdings.  
Overall, these results indicate that High default risk bidders resemble zombie 
companies, i.e. firms with poor financial performance, that keep operating, not only because 
of inefficient insolvency rules as argued by McGowan, Andrews and Millot (2017), but also 
by taking over similar zombie targets. Given the considerable dissimilarities between the 
two groups in key target, bidder and deal attributes, we include a host of these variables in 
our multivariate analysis to explain acquisition returns.   
 [Insert Table 4 here] 
4.2.2 Post-bid operating performance 
We evaluate post-deal operating performance to assess synergy gains. We compare 
bidder post-bid performance (ROA) to the performance of a hypothetical portfolio assuming 
                                                 
(1989) arguments, stock acquisitions might be the preferred option for this type of acquisitions to avoid 
discipline imposed when raising external funding. Alternatively, target shareholders may want to exit the 
distressed target and expecting promised synergies to materialise. Eckbo, Makaew and Thorburn (2018) argue 
that target shareholders are more willing to accept stock payments as long as they know better/more about 
bidders. It is possible that the target firm is willing to accept the offer from a financial distress bidder only if 
it has already a better understanding of the bidder. Another measure to Eckbo et al., (2018) variables could 
be the distance (e.g., miles) between these two firms. Target shareholders will also benefit as the bidding firm's 
share price is undervalued during the financial distress period. However, since the interaction variable 
between default risk and stock dummy is not significant, confirming that the negative long-run returns are 
independent of the payment method, we consider these issues in future research.  
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that the takeover was simply a combination of bidder and target. Table 5, Panel A, confirms 
that all bidders underperform relative to the portfolio firm, suggesting that takeovers fail to 
deliver the expected synergy gains. The difference across the two groups is not significant. 
However, Panel B displays that the industry-adjusted ROA is strongly positive for Low yet 
negative for High default risk bidders. Remarkably, it increases for less risky acquirers. 
Given these results, we include post-bid operating performance in our regressions.   
[Insert Table 5 here] 
4.2.3 Multivariate analysis of short and long-term returns 
We consider whether distinctions in excess returns between our subsamples hold 
after controlling for target, bidder and deal characteristics by estimating the following 
equation: 
i
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where R is for the various measures of performance, Default risk is a dummy equal to one for 
High default risk firms, while ROAP and LeverageP21 are the 3 years post-bid average 
industry-adjusted ROA and total debt to total assets, respectively, and Control is for bidder, 
target and deal characteristics. We further split up ROAP into Profit marginP and Assets 
turnoverP, following Chartier, Ferrer, Liu and Silva’s (2017) arguments that cost synergies, 
captured by profit margin, are intuitive and tend to come quickly, while revenue synergies, 
which should be reflected in assets turnover, are harder to achieve and receive less attention 
by the management. We include industry and time dummies, and check variance inflation 
factors but find no strong multicollinearity between explanatory and control variables.  
The first column of Table 6 reports the short-term CAR results. The coefficient of High 
default risk is negative but not significant, confirming our univariate results. In line with 
                                                 
21 Fama and French (1993; 1996) asset pricing models include MTB, beta and size. According to these models leverage 
does not drive expected returns. Penman et al. (2007) find that leverage is negatively associated with future stock returns. 
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previous literature, we find that returns are lower for larger bidders, public targets, industry-
related and stock percentage, but higher in tender offers. In un-tabulated results, we find no 
effect of acquisition premium and the number of acquisitions completed during the post-
acquisition period.22  
Next, we examine post-bid BHARs in the last six columns of Table 6. The results 
show that High default risk bidders generate significantly lower peer-adjusted and market-
adjusted BHARs, even after controlling for bidder, target and bid features, thereby lending 
support to our Hypothesis 1b. We exclude leverage and profitability which, as emphasized 
above, are embedded in the classification of our High default risk sample. In Columns 3-4 
and 6-7, we run separate regressions for the High and Low default risk samples. In both 
cases, profit margin is significant, but not the assets turnover. The coefficient for leverage is 
strongly significant and negative. These results suggest that bidders who efficiently manage 
acquisitions and succeed at realizing synergies, while not having too much leverage, 
generate significantly better long-run returns. However, while the effect of profitability is 
also more elevated, it is evident that the impact of leverage is specifically strong for High 
default risk bidders. The marginal effect of debt is more than double for this subsample, 
implying that high leverage is quite detrimental for their long-run returns. 
The results also indicate that Low default risk bidders generate lower BHARs in deals 
financed with higher stock proportions, while High default risk bidders earn lower returns 
in cross-border transactions. For High default risk bidders, the payment method does not 
affect long-term returns, contrary to Rau and Vermaelen’s (1998) performance extrapolation 
hypothesis. The remaining variables have no strong and consistent effects suggesting that, 
overall, while post-bid long run returns are significantly lower for High default risk bidders, 
their determinants are relatively homogeneous across the two types of bidders.  
                                                 
22 Billet and Qian (2008) obtain lower returns for experienced acquirers and relate this to managerial overconfidence.  
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[Insert Table 6 here] 
4.2.4 Alternative pre-bid distress proxies  
So far, we identified High default risk bidders using the standard Merton (1974) 
distance-to-default model, which may lead to misclassification (Bharath and Shumway, 
2008).  In particular, we show that our High default risk bidders do not have lower cash 
balances on average and are able to issue stock for financing acquisitions despite potential 
debt overhang issues. Their median EBITDA is positive, although lower than that of Low 
default risk bidders, while leverage is higher. These findings may suggest that our sample 
could include firms that are highly levered but not necessarily likely to default. We test for 
robustness by replicating our results using a range of alternative definitions of default risk.  
First, we use Altman (1968) Z-score and categorize bidders with a score lower than 
1.81 as High default risk.23 The relatively high debt of High default risk bidders could be the 
result of poor prior performance or raising vast amounts of debt. We consider firms with 
higher debt to be financially rather than economically risky and assess whether their long-
run returns are distinct. We find, but not report, no significant difference; the median peer-
adjusted 3-year BHARs of high default risk bidders, with low and high leverage are -9.5% 
and -15.3% (p = 0.863), compared to 3.0% and -2.0% (p = 0.681) for low risk bidders, 
respectively. We also find that 32% (25%) of our high (low) default risk bidders pay with 
shares (p = 0.013). 
Next, we rank our sample into pre-bid DD quintiles, using an estimation window of 
-280 to -31 days prior to deal announcement and we classify only the highest default risk 
quintile as High default risk. We then re-run our regressions using both alternative distress 
proxies in Table 7. Overall, the results are comparable to those in Table 6. They indicate that 
                                                 
23 According to Altman (1968), 𝑍𝑍 − 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 = 1.2 ∗ 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇
+ 1.4 ∗ 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇
+ 3.3 ∗  𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇
+ 0.6 ∗  𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇
+ 0.999 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇
 , with WC 
being working capital, TA total assets, RE retained earnings, EBIT earnings before interest and taxes, MV market value of 
equity, TL total liabilities, and SALES turnover. 
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the long run returns are significantly lower for High default risk bidders and mainly driven 
by profit margin and leverage. In contrast, the announcement date returns are relatively 
similar across the two groups but more positive in tender offers. They are lower for larger 
bidders, and for public and stock financed deals. In unreported tables, we find similar results 
using 3 years pre-bid BHARs and accounting returns like EBITDA to classify High default 
risk bidders.  
[Insert Table 7 here] 
4.2.5 Additional robustness checks 
We first replicate our analysis using 2,351 completed bids undertaken by bidders 
from 38 non-US countries to assess whether our findings are US specific. For space 
considerations, we report all the results in the appendix. Appendix 4 states the countries 
included in the rest of the world (ROW) sample. Appendix 5, Panel A, displays a small but 
positive average announcement excess return of 1.1% for High default risk bidders, while 
the median is zero. Short-term returns for Low default risk bidders are close to zero.24 Panel 
B confirms that High default risk bidders generate strongly negative average and median 
peer-adjusted and median market-adjusted BHARs, while those of Q4 are not negative. 
Overall, these results are similar to the US sample. Appendix 6 confirms our US-based key 
regression findings. High default risk bidders generate similar announcement but worse 
long-term abnormal returns. Across the two subsamples, BHARs are essentially determined 
by post-bid operating performance and leverage. Curiously, shareholder and creditor rights 
have no effects. High default risk bidders perform better than their US counterparts as they 
are more successful at realizing synergies. Appendix 7, Panel A, shows that post-bid 
performance of a portfolio of combined bidder and target returns of High default risk bidders 
                                                 
24 Prior literature points out that announcement date abnormal returns in Europe tend to be zero or slightly positive as 
opposed to mostly negative in the US (e.g., Martynova and Renneboog, 2011). 
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is better than for Low default risk bidders. In line with US findings, Panel B shows that 
industry-adjusted ROA increases (decreases) for Low (High) default risk bidders. 
We assess whether High default risk bidders engage in risky deals, which may benefit 
shareholders at the expense of debtholders to test the risk-shifting hypothesis. We follow 
Eisdorfer (2008) and assess whether High default risk bidders pursue larger acquisitions 
when there is more uncertainty and risk. We link relative deal size to expected market 
volatility for our subsamples.25 We then regress post-bid BHARs on an interaction term 
between relative deal size and distress, separately for subsamples with low and high expected 
market volatility. The risk shifting hypothesis predicts a negative interaction variable 
between relative deal size and distance-to-default in the high expected market volatility 
subsample to imply that larger acquisitions by High default risk bidders generate lower 
returns than acquisitions of Low default risk bidders when uncertainty is high. Appendix 8 
indicates that High default risk bidders do smaller deals in times of high uncertainty. The 
relation between takeover size and BHARs does not depend on the level of default risk, as 
the interaction term is insignificant for peer-adjusted BHARs, and positive and significant 
at 10% level for market-adjusted BHARs, in contrast to risk shifting theory expectations. 
Previous studies report that bidder excess returns are lower for stock-financed deals, 
in line with both the market-driven model of Shleifer and Vishny (2003) whereby firms with 
overpriced shares undertake all-stock financed acquisitions to obtain the target at an effective 
discount before their mispricing is revealed, and the expected takeover synergy motivation 
whereby targets may end up accepting overpriced bidder stock (Rhodes-Kropf et al., 2005; 
Dong et al., 2006; Savor and Lu, 2009; Faccio and Masulis, 2005).26 Moreover, managers 
                                                 
25 In line with Eisdorfer (2008), we estimate expected market volatility with generalized autoregressive conditional 
heteroscedasticity (GARCH) models, introduced by Engle (1982) and developed by Bollerslev (1986). We apply a GARCH 
(1, 1) model to monthly returns of the MSCI US equity index. The annual expected volatility is the sum of monthly expected 
volatilities over a 12 month period ahead of deal announcement. We use median market volatility to build our subsamples. 
26 Andrade et al. (2001) report that the use of cash as a method of payment in corporate takeovers is time dependent, as it 
was prevalent during the 1980s, and over the first decade of the new century, but declined significantly during the 1990s. 
Karampatsas, et al. (2014) show that firms with high credit ratings are more likely to make cash acquisitions because of 
their low cash constraints and their ability to access debt market.  
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undertake value-destroying stock acquisitions when they want to maintain market mispricing 
(Jensen, 2004) and when they pay a higher acquisition premium (Fu et al., 2013). 
However, Eckbo, Makaew and Thornburn (2013) reject the market-driven 
explanation. They view all stock financing deals as part of an overall capital structure 
optimization, implying that overleveraged firms, like our High default risk bidders, will use 
stock financing. Consistently, Table 4, Panel A reveals that High default risk bidders have a 
higher propensity to pay with shares. Table 6 reports that the percentage stock payment is 
negatively related to long-term returns for Low default risk bidders, but it is not significant 
for High default risk bidders. The use of the bidder’s stock as a payment method provides a 
positive certification effect. We conduct an extra test to find out whether payment method 
drives our findings. In Appendix 9, the interaction term of default risk and payment method 
is not significant confirming that the negative return effect of all stock deals is independent 
of bidder default risk. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper contributes to studies on the effect of bidder financial characteristics on 
M&As. We focus on the extent to which the outcome of takeovers depends on pre-bid default 
risk level of the acquirer. We argue that M&As undertaken by High default risk bidders are 
more controversial as, while they may result in positive synergies, they could be undertaken 
to enable managers to avoid personal bankruptcy costs and loss of reputation. We find that, 
on average, these bidders are loss making, and tend to opt for rather risky, diversifying and 
stock-paid acquisitions. Their long-term returns are significantly negative, while the control 
groups do not underperform, implying that the well-established long-run negative returns of 
acquiring firms is largely driven by High default risk bidders. These results continue to hold 
after controlling for bidder, target and deal characteristics. We report that the ex-post 
industry-adjusted profit margin and leverage principally account for the poor long-term 
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returns, and their marginal effects are larger for High default risk bidders. Overall, our results 
suggest that M&As of High default bidders are likely to be size-motivated with limited 
synergies, in line with agency theory predictions.   
Further research should highlight the extent to which our High default risk bidder 
M&A outcomes are affected by governance factors, such as managerial ownership (e.g. 
Agrawal and Mandelker, 1987), option-based managerial compensation which are likely to 
motivate CEOs to make risk-increasing acquisitions (Armstrong and Vashishtha, 2012; 
Furfine and Rosen, 2011), CEO age (Jenter and Lewellen, 2015), and improvements in 
bidders’ quality of corporate governance in the post 2009 financial crisis period which led 
to positive announcement date excess returns (Alexandridis, Antypas and Travlos, 2017). 
These governance factors are likely to affect only low default risk bidders. We could also 
assess the effectiveness of M&A as a recovery strategy after collecting manually all 
restructuring tactics undertaken by all distressed firms. It would be interesting to explore 
further the method of payment. Finally, we could address further the potential endogeneity 
bias and reverse causality in a number of model specifications used in the study. In 
unreported results, we use the propensity score method to compare the announcement date 
and long-run returns of deals announced by high default risk bidders and low default risk 
bidders. We first estimate the probability of a merger deal announced by a high default risk 
bidder using the same independent variables as shown in columns (1), (2) and (5) of Table 
6. We then re-estimate the logit regression using the matched sample. We also examine the 
differences in means for each observable characteristic between treatment and matched 
control groups. We find no distinguishable trends between the treatment and control group, 
suggesting that any difference in merger performance between the two groups is due to the 
default risk of bidders and that high default risk bidders tend to have much lower long-run 
post-merger returns compared to otherwise indistinguishable bidders with low default risk.  
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Table 1: Annual and industry distribution of the sample firms 
  Low default risk High default risk  
  N % N % 
Panel A. Sample breakdown by M&A announcement year 
1989-93 67 5.08 6 1.36 
1994 26 1.97 1 0.00 
1995 36 2.73 3 0.68 
1996 31 2.35 6 1.36 
1997 75 5.69 12 2.73 
1998 135 10.24 24 5.45 
1999 136 10.32 52 11.82 
2000 89 6.75 58 13.18 
2001 66 5.01 59 13.41 
2002 39 2.96 33 7.50 
2003 52 3.95 36 8.18 
2004 77 5.84 19 4.32 
2005 83 6.30 19 4.32 
2006 92 6.98 9 2.05 
2007 94 7.13 9 2.05 
2008 62 4.70 9 2.05 
2009 46 3.49 40 9.09 
2010 65 4.93 26 5.91 
2011 47 3.57 19 4.32 
Total 1,318 100 440 100 
Panel B. Industry distribution of sample firms 
Agriculture, forestry & fishing 2 0.15 0 0.00 
Mining & construction 86 6.53 43 9.77 
Manufacturing 716 54.32 174 39.55 
Transportation, communications & utilities 164 12.44 65 14.77 
Wholesale, retail 101 7.66 33 7.50 
Services 249 18.89 125 28.41 
Total 1,318 100 440 100 
Panel C. Distribution of distance-to-default 
  N Mean  Median St. Dev. 
High Default Risk  Q1 Low distance-to-default 440 2.366 2.762 1.872 
 Q2 439 5.426 5.427 0.772 
Low Default Risk Q3 440 8.325 8.288 0.938 
 Q4 High distance-to-default 439 14.091 12.904 4.025 
All 1,758 7.558 6.791 4.897 
Notes. The sample includes 1,758 completed bids undertaken by US bidders over the period 1989-2011. We rank our bidders into quartiles 
according to their pre-bid distance-to-default, measured over the estimation window -280 to -31 days prior to deal announcement. The bidders 
are referred to as High default risk if they are classified in the quartile with the highest default risk. Low default risk includes all the remaining 
bidders. Panel C reports the distribution of distance-to-default.  
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Table 2: The short and long-term market reaction to M&A announcements 
    N Mean Median   
Panel A. Short-term market-adjusted CAR (-2; +2)   
High default risk Q1 Low distance-to-default 440 -0.009 -0.016***   
 
Low default risk 
 
Q2 439 -0.019*** -0.013***   
Q3 440 -0.012*** -0.007***   
Q4 High distance-to-default 439 -0.005* -0.005***   
Low default risk - High default risk  -0.7516 1.314   
Panel B. 3 years post-deal completion peer-adjusted BHAR   
High default risk Q1 Low distance-to-default 385 -0.247*** -0.234***   
 
Low default risk 
 
Q2 426 -0.151*** -0.091***   
Q3 433   -0.058 -0.062**   
Q4 High distance-to-default 425    0.010    0.021   
Low default risk - High default risk   3.534*** 4.323***   
Panel C. 3 years post-deal completion market-adjusted BHAR   
High default risk Q1 Low distance-to-default 428 -0.127*** -0.299***   
 
Low default risk 
 
Q2 433 -0.002 -0.089   
Q3 438 -0.021 -0.093***   
Q4 High distance-to-default 427 0.082*** 0.054   
Low default risk - High default risk   4.996*** 6.278***   
Panel D. Carhart (1997) four-factor model 3 years post-deal completion peer-adjusted abnormal returns 
    α β1 β2 β3 β4 
High default risk Q1 Low distance-to- default -0.873*** 0.156** 0.146 -0.052 -0.034 
 
Low default risk 
 
Q2 -0.525** 0.131** 0.148** -0.009 -0.042 
Q3 -0.296 0.094** -0.134** -0.024 -0.016 
Q4 High distance-to-default -0.111 0.019 -0.236*** 0.024 0.106 
Notes. The sample includes 1,758 completed bids undertaken by US bidders over the period 1989-2011. We rank our bidders into quartiles 
according to their pre-bid distance-to-default, measured over the estimation window -280 to -31 days prior to deal announcement. The bidders 
are referred to as High default risk if they are classified in the quartile with the highest default risk. Low default risk includes all the remaining 
bidders. In Panel A, the announcement date abnormal returns are based on the market model with α and β coefficients computed over the -
280 to -31 days relative to the announcement date 0. In Panel B, the peer-adjusted BHARs are computed relative to two-digit US SIC industry, 
size, market-to-book, and one year pre-acquisition BHRs matched firms. In Panel C, the excess returns are relative to the MSCI US equity 
index. In Panel D, we run the following Carhart (1997) four-factor model: 
pttttMpt MomentumHMLSMBRR εββββα +++++= 4321 )( and report the coefficients in percentage. ***, **, *, indicates significant 
at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively. The t-statistics between Low default risk and High default risk bidders are in bold. We have 
winsorized the data at 1%. 
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Table 3: Bidder, target and deal characteristics 
 
  Bidder Target Bidder  Target p-value Diff-in-Diff 
  Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
  Low default risk High default risk   
Panel A. Bidder and target characteristics   
Total assets ($m) 
Market value equity ($m) 
EBITDA/Total assets 
Total debt/Total assets  
Interest coverage ratio 
Cash/Total assets 
Market-to-book 
11,200.00 
19,066.98 
0.14 
0.21 
28.65 
0.14 
3.57 
2,851.03 
3,780.11 
0.15 
0.19 
10.69 
0.07 
2.57 
1,176.14*** 
1,135.84*** 
0.05*** 
0.23** 
31.56 
0.21*** 
3.17** 
205.83*** 
265.35*** 
0.11*** 
0.18 
5.88*** 
0.10*** 
2.13*** 
3,238.32a 
2,579.73a 
-0.07a 
0.34a 
-16.84a 
0.18a 
2.54a 
423.43a 
389.48a 
0.07a 
0.30a 
1.04a 
0.08 
1.05a 
507.97***a 
343.15***a 
-0.11*a 
0.29***a 
-16.23a 
0.21*** 
1.79*a 
84.60***a 
52.83***a 
0.06***a 
0.22**a 
1.94a 
0.10** 
1.34**a 
<0.00 
<0.00 
<0.00 
<0.00 
<0.00 
>0.10 
<0.00 
<0.00 
<0.00 
<0.00 
<0.00 
<0.00 
>0.10 
<0.00 
Panel B. Deal characteristics    
Industry relatedness 
Cross-border 
Relative target size 
Relative deal size 
Bidder's toehold 
Recession 
Stock percentage 
Target public 
Reverse takeover 
Tender offer 
Acquisition premium 
0.51 
0.14 
0.30 
0.32 
1.32 
0.31 
0.37 
0.97 
0.02 
0.28 
47.45 
1 
0 
0.11 
0.13 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
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0.49 
0.11c 
0.75a 
0.71a 
1.63 
0.38 
0.55a 
0.95b 
0.07 
0.18a 
52.27 
0 
0c 
0.34a 
0.38a 
0 
0 
0.61a 
1.00b 
0 
0.00a 
40 
  
  
 
Notes. The sample includes 1,758 completed bids undertaken by US bidders over the period 1989-2011. We rank our bidders into quartiles according to their pre-bid distance-to-default, measured over the estimation window -280 to 
-31 days prior to deal announcement. The bidders are referred to as High default risk if they are classified in the quartile with the highest default risk. Low default risk includes all the remaining bidders. ***, ** , * indicate that the 
difference between bidder and target is significant at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. a, b , c indicate that Low default risk is statistically different from High default risk at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
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 Table 4: Logit regression of bidder, target and deal characteristics 
Panel A. Determinants of bidder, target and deal characteristics  
  
1 = High default risk (Q1)                                                                              
0 = Low default risk (Q2-4)                                               
(1) 
1 = High default risk (Q1)                                               
0 = Low default risk (Q4)                                                          
(2) 
Bidder ROA 
      -2.483***       -6.547*** 
(0.004) (0.008) 
Bidder size 
      -0.641***       -1.287*** 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Bidder MTB 
     -0.074***      -0.134*** 
(0.002) (0.007) 
Bidder leverage 
       6.509***       18.796*** 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Bidder cash 
0.208 2.118 
(0.740) (0.222) 
Target ROA 
-0.024 0.216 
(0.940) (0.744) 
Target MTB 
-0.012 -0.055 
(0.456) (0.198) 
Target leverage 
  0.757* 0.475 
(0.062) (0.579) 
Target cash 
  0.906* 0.868 
(0.080) (0.444) 
Industry-relatedness 
      -0.647*** -0.162 
(0.000) (0.659) 
Cross-border 
 -0.560* 0.027 
(0.070) (0.962) 
Relative target size 
    0.283**    0.668* 
(0.047) (0.084) 
Initial stake 
  0.023* -0.001 
(0.055) (0.972) 
Stock percentage 
    0.708**      0.923** 
(0.012) (0.023) 
Tender offer 
       0.669***      0.997** 
(0.004) (0.048) 
Reserve takeover  
   0.663* -1.022 
(0.095) (0.223) 
Recession 
       4.160*** 0.511 
(0.000) (0.823) 
Observations 1,489 664 
Pseduo R-squared  0.43 0.78 
Acquisition premium  
-0.001 -0.005 
(0.485) (0.195) 
Observations 1,342 664 
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Pseduo R-squared  0.43 0.78 
Panel B. Differences between bidder and target characteristics 
  Low default risk High default risk 
MTB 0.020 0.029**c 
 (0.197) (0.040) 
ICR -0.001** 0.001c 
 (0.032) (0.168) 
Size  0.697*** 0.387***a 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Leverage -3.085*** -0.041a 
 (0.000) (0.911) 
Cash 0.019 -0.603a 
 (0.962) (0.158) 
ROA 1.093** -0.968***a 
 (0.020) (0.000) 
Observations 1,934 668 
Pseudo R-squared 0.30 0.12 
 
Notes. The table reports the results from logit regressions of our groups of firms on merging firms’ and deal characteristics. We rank our 
bidders into quartiles according to their pre-bid distance-to-default, measured over the estimation window -280 to -31 days prior to deal 
announcement. We refer to bidders that are classified in quartile 2 to 4 as Low default risk, while bidders classified in the first quartile (with 
the highest default risk) are classified as High default risk.  In Panel A the dependent variable is Low default risk = 0, High default risk = 1 in 
the first column, and in the second column the dependent variable equals zero if the bidders are classified in the fourth quartile (lowest default 
risk) and one if the bidders are High default risk. In Panel B the dependent variable is Low default risk bidder = 1, and their target = 0 in the 
first column, and in the second column the dependent variable is High default risk bidder = 1, and their target = 0. The bidders are referred to 
as High default risk if they are classified in the quartile with the highest default risk, Low default risk includes all the remaining bidders, and 
the dependent variable is equal to one for bidder and zero for target. The definition of the remaining variables is in Appendix 2. All regressions 
include industry and time dummies. ***, **, *, indicate significant at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively. The p-values are between 
parentheses. To test for differences in coefficients between High default risk and Low default risk bidders in Panel B, we use Z-statistics 
defined as = 𝑏𝑏1−𝑏𝑏2
�(𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑏𝑏12+𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑏𝑏22) . We denote by a, b , c when the coefficient b1 of Low default risk is statistically different from b2 of High default risk 
at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. The data are winsorized at 1%. 
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Table 5: The post-bid operating performance 
    N Mean Median 
Panel A. Post-bid less pre-bid merged ROA  
High default risk Q1 Low distance-to-default 360 -0.036*** -0.011** 
 
Low default risk 
 
Q2 374 -0.030*** -0.022*** 
Q3 379 -0.041*** -0.023*** 
Q4 High distance-to-default 370 -0.019*** -0.011*** 
Low default risk – High default risk  0.71 -1.57 
Panel B. 3 years post-bid completion industry-adjusted average ROA 
High default risk Q1 Low distance-to-default 366 -0.118*** -0.001 
 
Low default risk 
 
Q2 397 0.032*** 0.039*** 
Q3 412 0.049*** 0.049*** 
Q4 High distance-to-default 382 0.120*** 0.103*** 
Low default risk – High default risk  11.59*** 9.88*** 
Notes. The table reports the descriptive statistics of operating performance across our sample firms. We rank our bidders into quartiles 
according to their pre-bid distance-to-default, measured over the estimation window -280 to -31 days prior to deal announcement. The bidders 
are referred to as High default risk if they are classified in the quartile with the highest default risk. Low default risk includes all the remaining 
bidders. In Panel A, we make a hypothetical portfolio of bidder and target prior to the transaction and report the difference between the actual 
post-acquisition and the hypothetical ROA. In Panel B, we report the average industry-adjusted ROA over the 3 years post-acquisition period. 
The t-statistics between Low default risk and High default risk bidders are in bold. The data are winsorized at 1%. ***, **, *, indicate significant 
at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively. 
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Table 6: The determinants of announcement date and long-run returns 
  Short-term CAR (-2, +2) 3 years post-deal completion peer-adjusted BHAR 3-years post-deal completion market-adjusted BHAR 
  All All Low default risk High default risk All Low default risk High default risk  
High default risk  
-0.001    -0.177**         -0.266***   
(0.853) (0.016)   (0.000)   
Assets turnoverp 
  0.034 0.215  0.056 0.089 
  (0.656) (0.117)  (0.382) (0.294) 
Profit marginp 
         0.348***         0.729***b         0.191***       0.459***b 
  (0.001) (0.000)  (0.001) (0.000) 
Leveragep 
      -0.207**        -0.818***b     -0.215**      -0.606***b 
  (0.027) (0.006)  (0.043) (0.000) 
Bidder size 
 -0.003* 0.011 0.007 -0.004  -0.012 -0.016 -0.021 
(0.062) (0.453) (0.589) (0.784) (0.185) (0.173) (0.278) 
Bidder MTB 
0.001 0.002 -0.003 0.009     -0.009**     -0.017**  -0.003c 
(0.908) (0.667) (0.614) (0.318) (0.043) (0.022) (0.318) 
Industry-relatedness 
  -0.003* -0.011 -0.069 0.121 -0.023 -0.035 0.061 
(0.094) (0.723) (0.284) (0.301) (0.334) (0.345) (0.308) 
Cross-border 
-0.001 -0.015 0.066     -0.401**b -0.071 -0.032     -0.316**b 
(0.852) (0.936) (0.317) (0.039) (0.136) (0.388) (0.021) 
Relative target size 
-0.004 -0.043 0.009 -0.046 -0.036 -0.025 -0.036 
(0.278) (0.388) (0.592) (0.523) (0.224) (0.287) (0.177) 
Target public  
    -0.023** -0.055 0.098 -0.468 0.051  0.209*  -0.137 
(0.013) (0.753) (0.752) (0.271) (0.161) (0.055) (0.487) 
Tender offer 
     0.012** -0.019 -0.020 0.134 0.029 0.017 0.103 
(0.047) (0.761) (0.688) (0.478) (0.365) (0.424) (0.375) 
Stock percentage 
    -0.035** -0.075    -0.153** 0.081c       -0.196***       -0.253***  -0.098c 
(0.013) (0.143) (0.021) (0.467) (0.001) (0.000) (0.116) 
Observations 1,630 1,427 1,117 310 1,453 1,125 328 
Adj. R-squared  0.029 0.069 0.044 0.109 0.153 0.136 0.192 
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Table 7: Robustness checks – alternative definitions of pre-bid distress 
  (I) (II) 
  (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)  
  All All LDR HDR All LDR HDR All All LDR HDR All LDR HDR 
High default risk  
-0.001  -0.058***       -0.173**    0.006  -0.216***        -0.186***    
(0.811) (0.008)    (0.011)    (0.471) (0.009)    (0.005)    
Assets turnoverp 
    -0.012 0.388*c   0.052 0.195     0.054 0.071   0.118* 0.093 
    (0.855) (0.072)   (0.367) (0.342)     (0.433) (0.721)  (0.064) (0.544) 
Profit marginp 
     0.519*** 0.537***b   0.531*** 0.571***a      0.507***  0.803***a  0.519*** 0.697***a 
    (0.000) (0.001)   (0.000) (0.000)     (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Leveragep 
     -0.318*  -0.797**c    -0.301**  -0.952***a      -0.343**  -0.541**c   -0.429***  -0.689***b 
    (0.059) (0.023)   (0.032) (0.000)     (0.043) (0.013)  (0.003) (0.000) 
Bidder size 
 -0.003** -0.008 -0.006 -0.012 -0.007  -0.056** -0.041  -0.002* 0.003 -0.014 -0.032 -0.013  -0.028**  -0.058* 
(0.034) (0.565) (0.690) (0.748) (0.553) (0.012) (0.122) (0.090) (0.816) (0.322) (0.406) (0.274) (0.036) (0.093) 
Bidder MTB 
0.001 0.002 -0.002 0.009  -0.008*  -0.008* 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.005  -0.007*  -0.007* 0.008 
(0.772) (0.775) (0.611) (0.500) (0.091) (0.051) (0.953) (0.878) (0.396) (0.879) (0.708) (0.085) (0.085) (0.366) 
Industry-relatedness 
-0.003 0.008 -0.066 0.158 0.045 -0.009 0.133 -0.003 0.012  -0.091*  0.416**b 0.031 -0.027 0.121 
(0.132) (0.878) (0.192) (0.253) (0.252) (0.819) (0.197) (0.188) (0.808) (0.052) (0.016) (0.421) (0.505) (0.287) 
Cross-border 
-0.006 0.029 0.041 -0.085 -0.068 -0.037 -0.183 -0.001 -0.008 0.065  -0.524**b -0.053 -0.005 -0.076 
(0.344) (0.673) (0.566) (0.629) (0.252) (0.563) (0.217) (0.867) (0.690) (0.328) (0.044) (0.418) (0.945) (0.673) 
Relative target size 
 -0.009* -0.028 0.003 -0.127 -0.047 -0.021 -0.075 -0.005 -0.051 0.002  -0.121*c -0.047 0.017  -0.144***c 
(0.080) (0.543) (0.942) (0.164) (0.201) (0.616) (0.218) (0.262) (0.308) (0.575) (0.088) (0.191) (0.784) (0.001) 
Target public  
 -0.027* -0.009 0.113  -1.222c 0.132  0.214* -0.113  -0.023* 0.036 -0.029 -0.082 0.103 0.069 -0.015 
(0.069) (0.969) (0.473) (0.103) (0.292) (0.089) (0.780) (0.093) (0.851) (0.856) (0.463) (0.489) (0.620) (0.967) 
Tender offer   0.011** -0.004 -0.026 0.165 0.058 -0.019 0.026  0.009* 0.021 -0.030 0.095 -0.002 -0.015 -0.167 
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(0.032) (0.951) (0.696) (0.392) (0.216) (0.723) (0.846) (0.074) (0.751) (0.623) (0.664) (0.967) (0.794) (0.265) 
Stcok percentage 
  -0.035**  -0.072*  -0.087* -0.197  -0.192***  -0.207***  -0.259**c  -0.036***  -0.114*  -0.187*** 0.217  -0.261***  -0.244***   -0.329**c 
(0.042) (0.053) (0.091) (0.266) (0.000) (0.000) (0.017) (0.000) (0.089) (0.003) (0.252) (0.000) (0.000) (0.033) 
Observations 1,560 1,365 1,128 237 1,388 1,137 251 1,630 1,427 1,188 239 1,453 1,196 257 
Adj. R-squared  0.032 0.062 0.048 0.119 0.159 0.148 0.256 0.039 0.057 0.044 0.129 0.171 0.157 0.230 
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Appendix 1: Merton’s distance-to-default model 
Merton’s distance-to-default (DD) on day t is expressed as follows (Hillegeist et al., 2004; Vassalou 
and Xing, 2004; Akhigbe et al., 2007):  
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 = 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇,𝑡𝑡/𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡)  +  (𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 – 𝜎𝜎𝑇𝑇,𝑡𝑡2 /2) 𝑇𝑇  𝜎𝜎𝑇𝑇,𝑡𝑡  𝑇𝑇0.5      
Where, 
VA,t = market value of assets 
Lt = book value of 100 % short-term debt and 50 % long-term debt  
rf = risk-free rate 
σ A,t = annualized standard deviation of asset returns 
T = time to maturity 
The following input parameters are aggregated. The market value of equity and book value of financial 
debt are collected from Thomson DataStream. Further, we download the yield on the US government 
debt as a proxy for the risk-free interest rate. Time to maturity is commonly set to one year. The values 
of VA,t and σA,t can be inferred through an iterative process based on the Black-Scholes-Merton pricing 
model. We employ as starting values for the asset volatility the historical volatility of equity computed 
daily on the basis of a 250-day rolling window. The following non-linear equations need to be solved: 
𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇,𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁�𝑑𝑑1,𝑡𝑡� − 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠−𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁(𝑑𝑑2,𝑡𝑡) 
𝜎𝜎𝑅𝑅,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇,𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁�𝑑𝑑1,𝑡𝑡�𝜎𝜎𝑇𝑇,𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅,𝑡𝑡  
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Appendix 2: Variable definitions 
Variables Description 
Bidder and target firm-specific characteristics 
ROA EBITDA to total assets one year prior to acquisition 
ICR EBITDA to interest expense on debt one year prior to acquisition 
Size Log of total assets one year prior to acquisition 
MTB Market value of equity one month prior to acquisition divided by the book value of common equity one year prior to acquisition 
Leverage 
LeverageP 
Total debt to total assets one year prior to acquisition 
Average industry-adjusted total debt to total assets 3 years after acquisition 
Cash Cash and cash equivalents one year prior to acquisition 
Assets turnoverP Average industry-adjusted Sales to total assets 3 years after acquisition 
Profit marginP Average industry-adjusted EBITDA to sales 3 years after acquisition 
Deal characteristics 
Industry-relatedness Dummy variable equal to one if acquirer and target share the same three-digit US SIC code 
Cross-border Dummy variable equal to one if acquirer and target are located in a different country 
Relative target size  Ratio of target total assets to acquirer total assets one year prior to acquisition 
Relative deal size Ratio of transaction value to acquirer total assets one year prior to acquisition 
Bidder's toehold Percentage of bidder's stake in target four weeks prior to acquisition 
All stock 
Stock percentage 
Dummy variable equal to one if transaction is fully paid in stock 
Proportion of shares used to finance the takeover 
Tender offer Dummy variable equal to one if transaction is a tender offer 
Reverse takeover Dummy variable equal to one if transaction is a reverse takeover 
Target public Dummy variable equal to one if target is a quoted company 
Acquisition premium Price paid per share minus stock price of target 4 weeks before acquisition announcement, divided by the stock price of the target 4 weeks before acquisition announcement 
Recession Dummy variable that equals one if deal is closed in a global economic slowdown. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), this covers 4 periods: 1990–1993, 1998, 2001–2002 and 2008–2009 
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Appendix 3. High-default risk acquirers and merger premiums 
  Merger premiums 
  (1) (2) 
High default risk  
    0.068** -0.082 
(0.045) (0.149) 
High default risk×Stock percentage 
     0.177** 
 (0.036) 
Target ROA 
      -0.203***       -0.271*** 
(0.007) (0.000) 
Target MTB 
      -0.007***       -0.008*** 
(0.002) (0.005) 
Target leverage 
0.097 0.094 
(0.197) (0.181) 
Target cash 
 0.126*   0.132* 
(0.087) (0.070) 
Industry-relatedness  
-0.023 -0.034 
(0.349) (0.168) 
Cross-border 
0.041 0.054 
(0.404) (0.208) 
Relative target size 
-0.004 0.008 
(0.391) (0.442) 
Initial stake 
0.002 0.001 
(0.740) (0.709) 
Tender offer 
     0.102**     0.076** 
(0.012) (0.023) 
Stock percentage  
0.051 0.022 
(0.178) (0.256) 
Reverse takeover  
0.112 -0.022 
(0.233) (0.457) 
Observations 1,296 1,296 
Adj. R-squared  0.071 0.086 
Notes. The table reports the result of high-default risk acquirers and merger premiums. We rank our bidders into quartiles according to their 
pre-bid distance-to-default, measured over the estimation window -280 to -31 days prior to deal announcement. The bidders are referred to as 
High default risk if they are classified in the quartile with the highest default risk. The dependent variable is merger premiums are calculated 
as the price paid per share minus stock price of target 4 weeks before acquisition announcement, divided by the stock price of the target 4 
weeks before acquisition accnouncement. Target ROA is the EBITDA to total assets one year prior to acquisition for target firms. Target MTB 
is the market value of equity one month prior to acquisition divided by the book value of common equity one year prior to acquisition for 
target firms. Target leverage is the total debt to total assets one year prior to acquisition for target firms. Target cash is the ratio of cash and 
cash equivalents and total assets one year prior to acquisition for target firms. Industry-relatedness is a dummy variable equal to one if acquirer 
and target share the same three-digit US SIC code, and zero otherwise. Cross-border is a dummy variable equal to one if acquirer and target 
are located in a different country, and zero otherwise. Relative target size is the ratio of target total assets to acquirer total assets one year prior 
to acquisition. Initial stake is the percentage of target stocks held by acquirer before the merger announcement. Tender offer is a dummy 
variable equal to one if transaction is a tender offer, and zero otherwise. Stock percentage is the percentage of stock used as the method of 
deal payment. Reverse takeover is a dummy variable equal to one if transaction is a reverse takeover, and zero otherwise. All our regressions 
include time and industry effects and intercepts whose coefficients are not reported. The p-values in parentheses are based on cluster adjusted 
robust standard errors (Petersen, 2009). ***, **, * indicate significant at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively. The variables are winsorized 
at 1%.  
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Appendix 4: Distribution of rest of the world (ROW) sample firms by country of origin 
Acquirer country CR SR 
Low default risk High default risk 
N % N % 
Argentina 1 3 4 0.23 0 0.00 
Australia 3 4 135 7.66 37 6.29 
Austria 3 4 9 0.51 3 0.51 
Belgium 2 2 13 0.74 6 1.02 
Brazil 1 5 11 0.62 9 1.53 
Canada 1 4 180 10.21 70 11.90 
Chile 2 5 4 0.23 0 0.00 
Colombia 2 4 1 0.06 1 0.17 
Denmark 3 4 14 0.79 2 0.34 
Egypt 2 4 2 0.11 0 0.00 
Finland 1 4 19 1.08 8 1.36 
France 0 5 123 6.98 17 2.89 
Germany 3 4 79 4.48 21 3.57 
Greece 1 3 11 0.62 3 0.51 
Hong Kong 4 4 20 1.13 10 1.70 
India 2 4 25 1.42 19 3.23 
Ireland 1 4 2 0.11 4 0.68 
Israel 3 4 8 0.45 2 0.34 
Italy 2 4 29 1.64 10 1.70 
Japan 2 5 331 18.77 197 33.50 
Malaysia 3 4 14 0.79 8 1.36 
Mexico 0 3 7 0.40 4 0.68 
Netherlands 3 4 63 3.57 11 1.87 
New Zealand 4 5 9 0.51 1 0.17 
Norway 2 4 20 1.13 10 1.70 
Peru 0 5 3 0.17 0 0.00 
Philippines 1 5 5 0.28 3 0.51 
Portugal 1 4 1 0.06 1 0.17 
Singapore 3 4 22 1.25 9 1.53 
South Africa 3 5 24 1.36 4 0.68 
South Korea 3 6 18 1.02 39 6.63 
Spain 2 6 37 2.10 1 0.17 
Sweden 1 4 51 2.89 15 2.55 
Switzerland 1 3 43 2.44 4 0.68 
Taiwan 2 5 17 0.96 9 1.53 
Thailand 2 4 11 0.62 9 1.53 
Turkey 2 4 1 0.06 1 0.17 
United Kingdom 4 5 397 22.52 40 6.80 
Total   1,763 100 588 100 
Notes. The sample includes 2,351 completed bids undertaken by bidders from 38 non-US (ROW) countries over the period 1989-2011. 
We rank our bidders into quartiles according to their pre-bid distance-to-default, measured over the estimation window -280 to -31 days 
prior to deal announcement. The bidders are referred to as High default risk if they are classified in the quartile with the highest default 
risk. Low default risk includes all the remaining bidders. CR is for creditors’ rights and SR is for shareholders’ rights, based on Djankov 
et al. (2008) and Spamann (2010). The higher these values the better the creditors and shareholders rights.  
52 
 
Appendix 5: ROW: The short and long-term market reaction to M&A announcements 
    N Means Medians   
Panel A. Short-term market-adjusted CAR (-2; +2)   
High default risk Q1 Low distance-to-default 576 0.011** 0.000 
  
 
Low default risk 
 
Q2 567 -0.001 -0.002   
Q3 555 0.005 0.002   
Q4 High distance-to-
default 582 0.002 0.001 
  
Low default risk - High default risk   -2.208** 0.444   
Panel B. 3 years post-deal completion peer-adjusted BHAR   
High default risk Q1 Low distance-to-default 412 -0.154*** 
-
0.098*** 
  
 
Low default risk 
 
Q2 431 -0.077* -0.051*   
Q3 423 -0.017 -0.017   
Q4 High distance-to-
default 432 -0.018 0.009 
  
Low default risk - High default risk 2.370** 2.509**  
 
Panel C. 3 years post-deal completion market-adjusted BHAR 
  
High default risk Q1 Low distance-to-default 412 0.051 -0.155* 
  
 
Low default risk 
 
Q2 431 0.032 -0.074   
Q3 423 0.047 -0.04   
Q4 High distance-to-
default 432 0.068** -0.003 
  
Low default risk - High default risk -0.035 2.382**   
Panel D. Carhart (1997) four-factor model 3 years post-deal completion peer-adjusted abnormal returns 
        Α β1 β2 β3 β4 
High default risk Q1 Low distance-to-default -0.047 0.211*** 0.185 0.116 -0.091 
 
Low default risk 
 
Q2 -0.391** 0.194*** 0.338***   0.080   -0.105** 
Q3 -0.201 0.134***   -0.010 0.054   -0.102** 
Q4 High distance-to-
default -0.253   0.012 -0.165** -0.016 0.047 
Notes. The sample includes completed bids undertaken by ROW (rest of the world) bidders over the period 1989-2011. We rank our bidders 
into quartiles according to their pre-bid distance-to-default, measured over the estimation window -280 to -31 days prior to deal announcement. 
The bidders are referred to as High default risk if they are classified in the quartile with the highest default risk. Low default risk includes all 
the remaining bidders. In Panel A, the announcement date abnormal returns are based on the market model with α and β coefficients computed 
over the -280 to -31 days relative to the announcement date 0. In Panel B, the peer-adjusted BHARs are computed relative to the bidder’s 
geographical region, two-digit US SIC industry, size, market-to-book and one year pre-acquisition BHRs matched firms. In Panel C, the excess 
returns are relative to the MSCI US equity index. ***, **, *, indicates significant at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively. The t-statistics 
between Low default risk and High default risk bidders are in bold. We have winsorized the data at 1%. In Panel D, we run the following 
Carhart (1997) four-factor model: 
pttttMpt MomentumHMLSMBRR εββββα +++++= 4321 )( and report the coefficients in 
percentage. ***, **, *, indicates significant at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively. The t-statistics between Low default risk and High 
default risk bidders are in bold. We have winsorized the data at 1%. 
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Appendix 6: ROW – The determinants of announcement date and long-run returns 
 Short-term CAR (-2;+2) 3 years post-deal peer-adjusted BHAR 3 years post-deal market-adjusted BHAR 
  All All LDR HDR All LDR HDR 
High default risk 0.004 -0.197***                              -0.118***             
 (0.482) (0.000)                           (0.000)             
Assets turnoverP   0.094 0.144  0.089** 0.200**a 
   (0.166)  (0.392)  (0.045) (0.035)  
Profit marginP   0.427***    0.582***a    0.392***   0.255***b 
   (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000) (0.008)  
LeverageP   -0.566*** -0.708*a   -0.306***   -0.630***a 
   (0.002)  (0.059)  (0.006) (0.001)  
Bidder size -0.003** 0.0174 -0.006    0.115***a    0.022*** 0.0123    0.055***b 
 (0.027) (0.234) (0.689)  (0.007) (0.008) (0.175) (0.006)  
Bidder MTB -0.001 0.003 0.002 -0.001   -0.011***     -0.014*** -0.004b  
 (0.352) (0.572) (0.777)  (0.936) (0.007) (0.001) (0.552)  
Industry-relatedness 0.003 0.0481 0.062  -0.019b 0.015 -0.027   0.161**b 
 (0.426) (0.340) (0.241)  (0.882) (0.619) (0.393) (0.028)  
Cross-border 0.008** -0.096* -0.068  -0.214 -0.044 -0.035 -0.011  
 (0.043) (0.094) (0.266)  (0.239) (0.181) (0.338) (0.885)  
Relative target size -0.004 0.012 -0.023   0.145**a -0.028 -0.027 -0.013  
 (0.216) (0.695) (0.580)  (0.031) (0.154) (0.304) (0.666)  
Target public -0.018 -0.153 -0.217 -0.146 -0.043 -0.286 0.076b  
 (0.295) (0.510) (0.482)  (0.686) (0.737) (0.153) (0.583)  
Tender offer -0.003 0.016 0.003  0.103 0.032 0.037 0.033  
 (0.439) (0.771) (0.958)  (0.467) (0.321) (0.277) (0.661)  
All stock -0.001 -0.073 -0.131* 0.120a -0.077**     -0.112*** -0.004a  
 (0.728) (0.252) (0.057)  (0.430) (0.037) (0.008) (0.962)  
Creditor rights -0.002 -0.027 -0.014 -0.110c -0.023** -0.014  -0.077**c 
 (0.183) (0.187) (0.508)  (0.132) (0.049) (0.246) (0.037)  
Shareholder rights 0.002 0.019 0.053 -0.083b 0.028 0.025 0.019 
 (0.486) (0.662) (0.262)  (0.442) (0.254) (0.334) (0.752)  
Observations 1,932 1,287 981            306 1,659 1,263 396  
Adj. R-squared 0.015 0.030 0.023        0.007 0.130 0.122 0.200 
Notes. The dependent variables are announcement date, the 3 years post-deal completion peer-adjusted BHAR (matched by two-digit industry, size, MTB and pre-acquisition BHR), and market-adjusted BHAR. L(H)DR is for Low (High) 
default risk bidders. Bidders are ranked into quartiles according to their pre-bid distance-to-default, measured over the estimation window -280 to -31 days prior to deal announcement. High (Low) default risk are bidders in the highest 
default risk quartile (remaining bidders). The remaining variables are as defined in Appendix 2. All our regressions include time and industry effects. The p-values in parentheses are based on cluster adjusted robust standard errors 
(Petersen, 2009). ***, **, *, indicate significant at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively. The differences in coefficients between High and Low default risk bidders are tested using Z-statistics defined as: = 𝑏𝑏1−𝑏𝑏2
�(𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑏𝑏12+𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑏𝑏22) .  We denote by a, b 
, c when the coefficient b1 of Low default risk is statistically different from b2 of High default risk at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. The variables are winsorized at 1%.  
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Appendix 7: ROW – The post-bid operating performance 
    N Mean Median 
Panel A. Post-bid less pre-bid merged ROA  
High default risk Q1 Low distance-to-default 482      -0.003    -0.002 
 
Low default risk 
 
Q2 510 -0.021*** -0.008*** 
Q3 495 -0.019*** -0.013*** 
Q4 High distance-to-default 500 -0.022*** -0.015*** 
Low default risk – High default risk -2.855*** -3.576*** 
Panel B. 3 years post-bid completion industry-adjusted average ROA 
High default risk Q1 Low distance-to- default 508 -0.02*** -0.012*** 
 
Low default risk 
 
Q2 524       0.001    0.003 
Q3 521 0.019*** 0.014*** 
Q4 High distance-to-default 534 0.024*** 0.022** 
Low default risk – High default risk 6.739*** 7.944*** 
Notes. The table reports the descriptive statistics results of operating performance across our sample firms in ROW (rest of the world). We 
rank our bidders into quartiles according to their pre-bid distance-to-default, measured over the estimation window -280 to -31 days prior to 
deal announcement. The bidders are referred to as High default risk if they are classified in the quartile with the highest default risk. Low 
default risk includes all the remaining bidders. In Panel A, we make a hypothetical portfolio of bidder and target prior to the transaction and 
report the difference between the actual post-acquisition and the hypothetical ROA. In Panel B, we report the average industry-adjusted ROA 
over the three year post-acquisition period. The t-statistics between Low default risk and High default risk bidders are in bold. The data are 
winsorized at 1%. ***, **, *, indicate significant at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively. 
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Appendix 8: Test of risk-shifting behaviour 
  (1) (2) 
 
Relative deal size 
3 years post-deal 
completion peer-
adjusted BHAR 
3 years post-deal 
completion market-
adjusted BHAR 
  
Low 
default 
risk 
High 
default 
risk 
Low High Low High 
Expected market volatility -1.288 -9.375**     
 (0.456) (0.040)     
Relative deal size   0.195 0.032 0.093 -0.110 
 
  (0.155) (0.777) (0.378) (0.126) 
Distress   -0.180 -0.050 -0.043 -0.007 
 
  (0.386) (0.654) (0.794) (0.925) 
Distance-to-default   -0.009 0.013 -0.001 0.002 
 
  (0.332) (0.297) (0.991) (0.794) 
Rel. deal size*Distance-to-default   -0.023* 0.007 -0.006 0.029* 
 
  (0.075) (0.736) (0.439) (0.053) 
Bidder leveragep   -0.749*** -0.278 -0.617*** -0.433*** 
 
  (0.001) (0.269) (0.001) (0.007) 
Bidder size -0.064*** -0.106*** 0.026 0.034* 0.033** -0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.231) (0.097) (0.024) (0.995) 
Bidder MTB -0.013*** -0.022*** 0.004 -0.001 -0.004 -0.013*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.505) (0.840) (0.316) (0.003) 
Bidder leverage 0.513*** 0.205     
 (0.000) (0.372)     
Industry-relatedness 0.047* 0.256*** -0.039 0.035 0.002 0.038 
 (0.068) (0.004) (0.563) (0.634) (0.974) (0.478) 
Cross-border -0.090*** -0.260* -0.110 0.122 -0.188** -0.007 
 (0.002) (0.086) (0.284) (0.239) (0.017) (0.930) 
Target public 0.139** -0.780** -0.150 0.036 -0.175 0.054 
 (0.016) (0.029) (0.681) (0.863) (0.543) (0.766) 
Tender offer -0.109*** 0.070 0.026 -0.026 0.127* 0.014 
 (0.000) (0.596) (0.777) (0.771) (0.068) (0.827) 
All stock -0.028 -0.002 -0.077 -0.150* -0.105 -0.276*** 
 (0.461) (0.978) (0.430) (0.091) (0.153) (0.000) 
Observations 1,222 384 769 670 780 685 
Adj. R-squared 0.162 0.231 0.022 0.016 0.109 0.110 
Notes. The table reports the results for the risk-shifting behaviour test in the acquisition decision of High default risk firms in line with Eisdorfer 
(2008). We rank our bidders into quartiles according to their pre-bid distance-to-default, measured over the estimation window -280 to -31 
days prior to deal announcement. The bidders are referred to as High default risk if they are classified in the quartile with the highest default 
risk. Low default risk includes all the remaining bidders. In (1) we report the regressions of relative deal size on expected annual market 
volatility for Low default risk and High default risk bidders. The independent variables are the 12 month ahead forecasted market volatility 
estimated using a GARCH (1,1) model and a set of control variables defined in Appendix 2. In (2) we report the regressions of post-bid returns 
on an interaction variable between relative deal size and distress in periods of low and high expected market volatility. The dependent variables 
are the 3 years peer-adjusted BHAR and 3 years market-adjusted BHAR. 
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Appendix 9: Interaction variable between High default risk and Method of payment 
  Short-term CAR (-2;+2) 
3 years post-deal completion 
peer-adjusted BHAR 
3 years post-deal completion 
market-adjusted BHAR 
High default risk -0.006 -0.0300 0.052 
 (0.446) (0.745) (0.456) 
All stock*High default risk 0.016 0.235 -0.028 
 (0.289) (0.107) (0.790) 
Assets turnoverP  0.0667 0.095* 
  (0.340) (0.058) 
Profit marginP  0.565*** 0.513*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
LeverageP  -0.424*** -0.505*** 
  (0.006) (0.000) 
Bidder size -0.004** 0.001 -0.012 
 (0.013) (0.934) (0.242) 
Bidder MTB 0.001 0.002 -0.007** 
 (0.944) (0.583) (0.025) 
Industry-relatedness -0.009** -0.035 -0.001 
 (0.044) (0.477) (0.960) 
Cross-border -0.001 -0.020 -0.080 
 (0.978) (0.769) (0.134) 
Relative target size -0.009 -0.034 -0.045 
 (0.102) (0.458) (0.124) 
Target public -0.033** -0.047 0.043 
 (0.015) (0.823) (0.762) 
Tender offer 0.020*** -0.017 0.052 
 (0.000) (0.781) (0.265) 
All stock -0.017*** -0.122* -0.164*** 
 (0.008) (0.077) (0.002) 
Observations 1,630 1,427 1,453 
Adj. R-squared 0.020 0.065 0.157 
Notes. The table reports the results of the regression of the announcement date, the three-year post-deal completion peer-adjusted BHAR 
(matched by two-digit industry, size, MTB and pre-acquisition BHR) and market-adjusted BHAR. We rank our bidders into quartiles according 
to their pre-bid distance-to-default, measured over the estimation window -280 to -31 days prior to deal announcement. The bidders are 
referred to as High default risk if they are classified in the quartile with the highest default risk. Low default risk includes all the remaining 
bidders. The remaining variables are as defined in Appendix 2. All our regressions include time and industry effects and intercepts whose 
coefficients are not reported. The p-values in parentheses are based on cluster adjusted robust standard errors (Petersen, 2009). ***, **, *, indicate 
significant at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively. The variables are winsorized at 1%.  
 
